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ABSTRACT
Copyright management information (CMI), defined by the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), is information
conveyed with a copyrighted work that identifies the owner
and nature of that copyright. Although the DMCA prohibits
the knowing removal of CMI under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b),
district court decisions relating to CMI are split on whether
its provisions apply only to digital forms or also extend to
non-digital CMI conveyance. This Article describes the
current state of CMI jurisprudence and the expected effects of
possible interpretive outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the Act) protects copyright management information (CMI) placed by a copyright’s owner.
The Act generally defines CMI as “information conveyed in
connection with [copyrighted works] . . . including in digital form,”
that identifies the owner and nature of the copyright itself. 1 However,
the statutory wording leaves open questions about whether the
protections are specific to digital CMI in digital media, digitally
created CMI in either digital or analog media, or all CMI in media.
Earlier CMI-related decisions split between two interpretive
camps. The narrower interpretation construed CMI protection strictly
within the context of the Act’s overarching legislative purpose. It
therefore limited CMI protection to digital measures, such as
copyright information embedded in software as a part of a larger
digital rights management (DRM) system. 2 Other courts favored a
broader approach and were willing to expand the CMI protection
beyond digitally stored CMI to digitally placed CMI, such as digitally
embedded watermarks in printed photos. Courts following the latter
approach avoided foreclosing the Act’s applicability to entirely
analog CMI.
Two recent district court decisions, McClatchey v. Associated
Press 3 and Associated Press v. All Headline News, 4 endorse an even
broader interpretation of the Act’s CMI provisions. Both decisions
explicitly extend the reach of the Act’s CMI provisions beyond
digital forms of transmission or conveyance to fully analog CMI
manifestations. This interpretation has potentially significant effects
1

17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., IQ Group v. Wiesner, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2006).
3
McClatchey v. Associated Press, No. 3:05-cv-145 (Johnstown), 2007 WL
776103 (W.D. Pa. March 9, 2007).
4
Associated Press v. All Headline News, 608 F. Supp 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
2
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on copyright enforcement, some of which are detailed below.
Absent an authoritative Supreme Court opinion, the split remains.
This Article surveys these cases, formulates a unified picture of the
Act’s CMI protections, and concludes with practical suggestions on
how to best assess the validity of a CMI claim under the Act.
I.THE DMCA AND CMI
The Act is a statutory implementation of two treaties with the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): the WIPO
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, both signed in 1996. 5 The Act broadly addresses the protection of digital production and dissemination of copyrighted
technological and technologically created works. 6 Two of the Act’s
many mandates are protection against circumvention of technological
copyright measures 7 and preservation of CMI. 8 The former, codified
in § 1201, targets a specific class of devices and services, but § 1202,
dealing with CMI, only imposes liability for certain acts.
Sections 1201 and 1202, known as the “anti-circumvention”
provisions, are the codification of Articles 11 and 12 of the 1996
WIPO Copyright Treaty, which requires parties to “provide adequate
legal protection . . . against the circumvention of effective
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with
the exercise of their rights” 9 and to provide “effective legal remedies
against any person knowingly . . . remov[ing] or alter[ing] any
electronic rights management information without authority.” 10 The
treaty itself is notable because it specifically mentions the protection
of electronic rights management.
5

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “international agreement” as including
the WTO Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty).
6
S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.02(B)(1) (Rev. Ed. 2010).
7
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
8
Id. § 1202.
9
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20,
1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright
Treaty].
10
Id. art. 12 para. 1.
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The language in §§ 1201 and 1202 differs subtly from that of the
treaty. Subject to several incidental exceptions, § 1201 bans the
“circumvent[ion of] technological measure[s] that effectively control
access” to protected works.11 Like the remainder of the Act, the
section specifically addresses “technological measures,” not other
measures more broadly covered by general copyright doctrine. This
language reflects Article 11. However, § 1202, which covers CMI
and implements Article 12, contains no such wording. Courts
disagree whether CMI, as protected by § 1202, must be by definition
a “technological measure” within the meaning of § 1201 or whether
the textual exclusion of technological requirements implies a broader
definition. This Article analyzes whether these two provisions should
be read in isolation or together as a broader statutory scheme.
II. CMI’S POSSIBLE MEANINGS UNDER THE DMCA
Section 1202 protects eight distinct categories of information as
CMI, if used “in connection with copies . . . performances or displays
of a work.” The categories include: (1) the work’s title; (2) its author;
(3) its copyright owner; (4) names of performers in non-audiovisual;
non-broadcast work; (5) names of writers, performers, and directors
in audiovisual, non-broadcast work; (6) terms and conditions for the
work’s use; (7) links, numbers, or codes referring to CMI; and (8) any
additional data properly added to the definition by administratively
promulgated regulation. 12
Data belonging to any of these categories may not be removed,
altered, or falsified if they are conveyed in conjunction with a copied
work. 13 Data not falling into one of § 1202’s eight CMI categories is
not protected under the Act’s provisions but may be subject to other
laws, such as unfair trade.14 Section 1202 claims require both intent
to remove or alter the CMI and a showing of actual infringement
resulting from the removal or alteration. 15 Violations of § 1202 are
11

17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
Id. § 1202(c).
13
Id. § 1202(a) and (b).
14
S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 16 (1998); see also NIMMER, supra note 6, at §
12A.09[A].
15
JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL
12
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punishable by actual and fixed statutory damages under § 1203. 16
Criminal penalties apply to willful and commercially exploitative
violators. 17
The debate about whether CMI protected by § 1202 must be a
“technological measure” centers on § 1202’s inapt wording and
poorly documented legislative history. Section 1202 contains no
mention of other Act-created provisions and includes the phrase
“including in digital form” when defining CMI for the purpose of
§ 1202. This implies that § 1202’s definitions have a broader reach
than merely that of the technological realm.
Because it is part of the Act, it is also possible to read § 1202 to
target only technological copyright protection methods and digital
methods of conveying CMI. This would rule out a broader interpretation including traditional copyright management, such as
copyright notices in textbooks. The Act was enacted with the stated
goal of creating “the legal platform for launching the global digital
on-line marketplace for copyrighted works” and to “make digital
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyright materials.” 18 It would follow that the Act’s provisions should be interpreted in the context of its legislative purpose. The first courts to
consider the issue espoused this context-sensitive view.
III. DMCA CONTEXT-SENSITIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF CMI
In 2006, a New Jersey district court provided the first detailed
interpretation of § 1202 in IQ Group v. Wiesner. 19 In IQ Group, the
defendant, Wiesner Publications, redistributed an online advertisement for a client shared with the plaintiff, IQ Group. In so doing,
it removed an embedded logo belonging to the plaintiff and replaced
it with its own. The court considered the breadth of § 1202’s
coverage in light of its statutory construction, the state of jurisprudence within the copyright field, and the statute’s legislative
MILLENNIUM § 4.03 (2000).
16
17 U.S.C. § 1203(c) (2006) (note that both § 1201 and § 1202 are
mentioned directly).
17
Id. § 1204(a).
18
S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
19
IQ Group v. Wiesner, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D.N.J. 2006).
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history.
Though it conceded that a literal reading of the statute implied a
broad application, the court determined that the statute should be
subject to a “narrowing interpretation” 20 that only protects CMI
functioning “as a component of an automated copyright protection or
management system.” 21 The court held that § 1202 should not be
“construed to cover copyright management performed by people,
which is covered by the Copyright Act.”22 Under this standard, the
court found insufficient evidence that the logo served as a component
of automated copyright protection or management and granted
summary judgment to the defendants.
The court reasoned that while authors traditionally used copyright
law to protect their legal rights, modern technological measures have
increasingly displaced law in controlling access to works. It noted
that the purpose of the Act was to protect those technological
measures rather than the copyrights themselves.23 It found support for
this view in the working papers of the executively mandated Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights, which drafted the largely
unchanged language of legislation now known as §§ 1201 and
1202. 24 The report giving rise to §§ 1201 and 1202, colloquially
called the “White Paper,” noted that the drafters intended the CMI
provisions to protect information vital to the implementation of
automated, digital-copyright management systems. 25 The language
presented in the White Paper passed through Congress with little
comment and no significant revision prior to enactment, suggesting
that legislators shared this interpretation. 26 Finally, the court noted
that this narrow interpretation made § 1202 consistent with § 1201, as
20

Id. at 593.
Id. at 597.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 593. See also Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A
Closer Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 984
(1996).
24
See id. at 594-97.
25
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, executive
summary (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/
execsum.html.
26
IQ Group, 409 F. Supp. 2d. at 596.
21

2011] DMCA’S COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION PROTECTIONS

303

well as Chapter 12 as a whole.
About one year later, a California district court largely followed
IQ Group’s reasoning in Textile Secrets v. Ya-Ya, though it reached a
somewhat less definitive conclusion. 27 The case involved an
allegedly copied textile design. 28 The plaintiff, Textile Secrets,
registered a copyright for a textile of its own design. The defendant, a
high-end clothing designer named Ya-Ya Brand Inc., had allegedly
taken sample yardage of the fabric provided by the plaintiff and
incorporated it into its own clothing after removing tags indicating
the design’s registered ownership. Textile Secrets argued that YaYa’s removal of the tag constituted a violation of § 1202.29
Applying basic principles of statutory construction, the court
reached a similar initial result to IQ Group and determined that §
1202 must be construed in light of Chapter 12 as a whole and as a
part of the Act’s Title I. 30 A literal reading, as also noted by IQ
Group, would result in § 1202’s applicability “wherever any author
has affixed anything that might refer to his or her name.” 31 It found
this interpretation impracticable within the context of the Act’s
structure, thus justifying an inquiry into § 1202’s legislative history.
The Textile Secrets court also assessed the White Paper and
subsequent legislative history and concurred with IQ Group’s
narrowed interpretation of § 1202. However, the court noted in
dictum that it did “not find it necessary to define the scope . . . [as]
only [applying] to copyright management information that functions
‘as a component of an automated copyright protection or
management system.’” 32 Thus, unlike in IQ Group, the Textile
Secrets court construed § 1202 as possibly applying to technological
measures that directly or effectively control access to work, not solely
to components of automated copyright management systems. 33
Both cases interpreted § 1202 narrowly; neither court imputed
tangible or non-digital forms of copyright information into § 1202’s
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Textile Secrets v. Ya-Ya, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1192-93.
Id. at 1195.
Id. (quoting IQ Group, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 593).
Id. at 1203, n. 18.
Id. at 1202-03.
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scope. But the dictum in Textile Secrets was a harbinger for a
wholesale interpretive change.
IV. BROADER INTERPRETATIONS OF CMI: GENERAL
APPLICABILITY?
Some recent district court decisions have broadened § 1202’s
applicability. Shortly after Textile Secrets, the district court of the
Western District of Pennsylvania held in McClatchey v. Associated
Press that § 1202 also applies to non-digital information. 34 Plaintiff
McClatchey took and subsequently registered a copyright for a photo
of Flight 93’s crash during the events of September 11, 2001. The
defendant, Associated Press (AP), allegedly redistributed the photo,
replacing McClatchey’s copyright information with its own.
In denying summary judgment for the AP, the court chose to
interpret § 1202 broadly based on the face of the statute; specifically,
it pointed to § 1202(c)’s assertion that “copyright management
information” includes “any” information falling within § 1202’s
categories, “including in digital form.” 35 The court reasoned that to
“avoid rendering those terms superfluous, the statute must also
protect non-digital information.” 36 It noted that the usage of a
computer to add copyright management information already
constitutes the use of a digital or technological device to add CMI. 37
Unlike the IQ Group or Textile Secrets courts, however, the
McClatchey court took a strictly textual approach to § 1202 interpretation and declined to participate in a detailed analysis of the
legislative history.
The McClatchey court used language in IQ Group to justify its
position. Part of IQ Group’s test for CMI protection is a determination of whether the CMI “functioned as a component of an
automated copyright protection system.” 38 Whereas in IQ Group this
determination was meant to cabin § 1202 strictly to CMI used as part
of an automated management system, the McClatchey court
34
35
36
37
38

McClatchey, 2007 WL 776103.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
IQ Group v. Wiesner, 409 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (D.N.J. 2006).
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understood this language to encompass the process of using software
to place copyright information on analog works, such as pictures. 39
This construction broadened the reach of § 1202 significantly.
Another recent case involving CMI also endorsed a broad
interpretation of § 1202, but rejected IQ Group’s and Textile Secrets’
approaches altogether. In 2009, a New York district court in
Associated Press v. All Headline News found § 1202’s language clear
enough on its face to bar any inquiry into its legislative history. 40 The
plaintiff, AP sued defendant All Headline News for misappropriating
news from the AP’s ticker and replacing the AP’s copyright notice
with its own. The Associated Press court declined to follow the
rationales of the decisions in IQ Group and Textile Secret, stating that
Second Circuit rules of statutory construction barred them from
inquiring into legislative history “‘to cloud statutory text that is clear’
even if there are ‘contrary indications in [that] history.’” 41 The court
then used similar logic as the McClatchey court in determining that
no inquiry into the methods or nature of the CMI removal was
necessary because the statute plainly contemplated even non-digital
alteration of analog data to be within its scope.42 Unlike McClatchey,
however, it found no reason to use language from IQ Group to justify
its decision, instead reading the statute itself as being applicable to all
kinds of copyright information, whether analog or digital. It notably
found no mention of “technological measures of automated systems”
within the statute itself and thus saw no reason to limit the section’s
applicability. 43
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF § 1202 CONSTRUCTION
It is unclear how this interpretive split will be resolved, though no
recent trial or appellate court has rejected the textualist approach
endorsed by McClatchey and Associated Press. A narrow § 1202
interpretation implies that CMI protection provisions are treated
separately from general copyright law. A broad § 1202 interpretation,
39
40
41
42
43

McClatchey, 2007 WL 776103, at *5.
Associated Press v. All Headline News, 608 F. Supp 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 461-62 (quoting Ratzlaf v. U.S., 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)).
Id. at 462.
Id.
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however, has several important implications not only for the availability of § 1203 damages, but also for trademark law, copyright law,
and for CMI process licensees and licensors.
A. Availability of § 1203 Damages
A broad interpretation of § 1202 would potentially increase the
availability of § 1203’s statutory damages. The earlier, narrower
§ 1202 interpretation made it difficult to prove violation and deterred
plaintiffs without cases clearly involving purely digital CMI from
attempting to claim § 1203 damages. However, recent courts’
willingness to extend § 1202 applicability may significantly increase
the number of statutory damage claims. 44 Such claims, if successful,
are lucrative. Section 1203 entitles the prevailing party to $2,500 to
$25,000 per violation, and the few courts that have interpreted
§ 1203’s meaning of “violation” have generally counted each
individual impression. 45 For works distributed online, the total
penalty could be astronomical. The threat of such large penalties may
cause artists and others creating works under fair use to be more
circumspect about the copyrighted works from which they draw
inspiration, possibly tilting the litigation balance in favor of copyright
holders. 46
B. Relationship Between DMCA CMI Requirements and
Trademark Law
A § 1202 interpretation broad enough to protect instances of
copyright protection and not simply automated protection methods
would pose overlapping trademark concerns. In many instances, CMI
bears the trademark of the copyright’s owner. A simple example
44

See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, AP Invokes DMCA Against Obama “Hope”
Poster Artist, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Mar. 23, 2009),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/03/ap-uses-dmca-intimidate-hope-artist.
45
17 U.S.C. § 1203(c)(3) (2006); see also Fred von Lohmann, supra note 45.
46
See, e.g., Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, No. 07 Civ.
11446-NG (D. Mass. July 9, 2010) (district court nullified a large jury award of
statutory damages on due process grounds, even though the award was statutorily
valid).
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would be the placement of a trademarked business name on a printed
photograph. This poses a dilemma; removal of CMI would violate the
Act, but retention of CMI in subsequent distribution may violate
trademark law. 47 No court has commented directly on this impasse,
though Associated Press implied in passing that source citations
could not be construed as trademark infringement.
C. Effects on Copyright Law
If § 1202 is applied to all types of CMI, whether analog, digital,
manual, or automated, requirements for fair use of copyright
information could be significantly altered. At the most textual end of
the spectrum, § 1202 makes no exception for fair use; removal or
alteration of copyright information is categorically prohibited
“without the authority of the copyright owner or law.” 48 Thus, in its
broadest reading, § 1202 practically requires retention of all previous
CMI, even for artistic transformations or renditions of existing works,
whether digital or analog in content or creation. Such an
interpretation would directly oppose the fair use concept that certain
types of use do not require the copyright holder’s permission. Any
failure to retain this CMI is subject to statutory penalties. A possible
defense, however, is to aver that because fair use is fundamentally not
infringement, the removal of CMI, whether or not intentional, cannot
lead to actual infringement. Thus, one required element of a § 1202
claim would be unfulfilled.
A context-sensitive but still broad reading of § 1202 would
protect digital or digitally placed CMI in both digital and analog
works, but not purely analog CMI. Under this approach, a determi47

See Eric Goldman, AP Enforcement Action Against Syndicator Survives
Dismissal Motion--AP v. All Headline News, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETING LAW
BLOG (Feb. 19, 2009), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/02/
ap_enforcement.htm. But see Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
539 U.S. 23 (2003) (holding that Lanham Act claims for false designation of origin
are barred if the copyrighted work in question becomes part of the public domain).
48
See, e.g., David Johnson, Court Split Widens over Whether DMCA Rules
against Removal of Copyright Management Information Apply Only to Automatic,
Computerized Copyright Management Systems, DAVID JOHNSON’S DIGITAL MEDIA
LAWYER BLOG (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.digitalmedialawyerblog.com/2009/03/
court_spilt_widens_over_whethe.html.
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nation of whether the Act protects the CMI in question would require
an inquiry into the exact process used to create the CMI as well as the
process used to alter it. For example, CMI such as copyright
information digitally embedded into an image’s metadata may be
protected if a wholly digital process was used in its subsequent
transformation under fair use, but not if the work was altered by a
manual or analog process (e.g., a physical transformation of a
physical print without visible CMI). 49 This approach would emphasize the method by which the CMI was altered or removed, rather
than by inquiry into whether CMI was removed at all.
D. Effects on CMI Process Owners
The courts also have not clarified whether CMI conveyance
dependent on external process is also protected, and whether those
processes must be preserved in subsequent redistribution of the
protected work. Only one case, Jacobsen v. Katzer, has commented
on the matter.50 Jacobsen involved two model train hobbyists, both of
whom created software frameworks for controlling model train
behavior. The plaintiff, who sold the software commercially, filed a
multifaceted suit against the defendant, who, under an open-source
license, created software that functionally overlapped with the
plaintiff’s software. In ruling on the plaintiff’s copyright claims, the
Jacobsen court noted in dicta that under §1202, if an automated
process is used to imprint CMI in software source code, that process
or another like it must retain the original CMI for subsequent
impressions. 51 The court also noted that accidental CMI omission
might be a violation of § 1202 if the omission takes place via intentional secondary means that unintentionally remove the CMI. For
example, if a protected piece of software relies on third-party
software both to embed CMI and provide a critical function to the
parent software, § 1202 may be violated if that third-party application
is replaced with another to enhance the non-CMI function it provides
but no longer conveys the attached CMI.
Such an interpretation of the CMI provisions may have significant
49
50
51

See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, supra note 45.
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 93 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
Id. at 1242-43.
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implications for CMI-generating process owners, such as software
manufacturers. Creators of CMI-generating processes may be forced
to give their process, or details about that process, away if a nonoriginal party adapts the work it protects. Both Jacobsen and the
statute itself are silent as to whether the owner or licensor of the CMI
imprinting mechanism is entitled to compensation if § 1202 mandates
its inclusion.
CONCLUSION
Though § 1202 and CMI have historically been a minor
component in litigation involving the sweeping Act, some recent
court cases have tended to broaden the reach of CMI protection. A
broad interpretation of § 1202 will increase the availability of statutory damages, alter copyright balance toward the right’s owners, and
affect related trademark law. If courts continue to trend toward
broader § 1202 interpretation, they must be prepared to handle a
much larger volume of cases posing Act and derivative claims. In
addition, litigants must consider several novel effects of CMI doctrine
when formulating their copyright complaints or defenses.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Advise clients to document current CMI conveyance and propagation processes. The clearer the connection between the CMI
and the underlying work’s protection scheme is made, the more
likely the CMI itself is to be protected.



Copyright owners should ensure that any copyright information
placed on a protected work clearly falls into one of § 1202’s eight
defined CMI categories.



Fully develop copyright-infringement claims before attempting to
assert a CMI claim, because the latter is dependent on the former.



To mitigate legal exposure, advise clients intending to manipulate
or integrate copyrighted works under fair use to only remove as
much embedded CMI as is necessary. Remind clients that fair use
is only a defense and not necessarily a deterrent to litigation.

